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Soñar el sueño imposible, 
Luchar con el enemigo invencible, 
Abrazar el pesar insoportable, 
Correr hacia donde no se atreven los valientes.. 
Enderezar el mal irreparable, 
Amar pura y castamente en la distancia, 
¡Intentar cuando tus brazos están cansados, 
alcanzar la estrella inalcanzable! 
Esta es mi búsqueda, perseguir esa estrella, no 
importa con qué desesperanza, no importa a qué 
distancia… 
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Como es ampliamente aceptado, la teoría financiera tradicional propone que el objetivo 
principal de la empresa debe ser maximizar la riqueza de sus accionistas, lo cual, en la práctica, 
significa maximizar el precio de mercado de los títulos que poseen. Este objetivo ha generado 
una abundante literatura y una amplia controversia sobre los efectos de las decisiones 
financieras en el valor de las empresas. Lejos de la situación de mercados perfectos analizada 
por Merton Miller y Franco Modigliani en sus seminales trabajos de 1958 y 1961, las 
investigaciones de las últimas décadas han demostrado la relevancia de las fricciones en los 
mercados de capitales tales como, los costes de transacción, los costes de agencia, los costes de 
quiebra o el pago de impuestos.   
En este contexto, no son pocos los estudios que han demostrado las consecuencias 
fiscales de las políticas financieras de la empresa. Desde esta perspectiva, la teoría estática del 
trade-off establece que el valor de la empresa alcanzará su culmen cuando se compensen los 
efectos contrapuestos de dos fuerzas: la deducibilidad fiscal del pago de intereses y el aumento 
en los costes de quiebra anejo a un aumento del nivel de deuda. Del mismo modo, también los 
dividendos se ven afectados por las leyes tributarias de los países, dado el diferente tratamiento 
fiscal de la distribución de beneficios en comparación con su retención.  
Dentro de las imperfecciones de los mercados financieros merece una mención especial 
el enfoque de la teoría de la agencia, según el cual los dividendos y la deuda pueden ser 
instrumentos eficaces para reducir los conflictos entre los distintos partícipes de la empresa. 
Específicamente, el reparto de dividendos o el incremento de su deuda atenúan la posibilidad 
de comportamiento oportunista de los directivos, al reducir los recursos bajo su control y 
susceptibles de ser usados discrecionalmente en busca de sus intereses y no para maximizar la 
riqueza de los inversores.   
Precisamente el enfoque de agencia permite incorporar las asimetrías informativas entre 
insiders y outsiders, lo que dota a las decisiones de dividendos y de estructura de capital de una 




nueva función. Así, estas políticas financieras se convierten en señales que transmiten 
información fiable sobre las oportunidades de inversión rentables al alcance de la empresa. Una 
característica de la investigación reciente en finanzas de empresa y en gobierno corporativo es 
la dimensión internacional que han tomado esos estudios, abordando variados entornos 
institucionales y legales. En este sentido, es sobradamente conocido el enfoque jurídico de las 
finanzas (Law & Finance) propuesto por La Porta et al. (1999; 1997; 1998; 2000), según el cual 
cabe distinguir dos tipos de ordenamientos jurídicos: los países cuyos sistemas legales 
provienen de la tradición anglosajona  o de ley común tienden a ofrecer una protección más 
adecuada a los inversores que los países cuyas leyes nacen en el contexto de la ley civil o 
continental.  
Llevado este planteamiento al ámbito de la política de dividendos, hay dos hipótesis que 
explican la relación entre la estructura legal de los países y la distribución de beneficios de las 
empresas. La primera afirma que un sistema legal que ofrezca una protección adecuada a los 
inversores fomenta el reparto de dividendos como forma de retribución de esos accionistas (the 
outcome hyphotesis). La explicación alternativa plantea que una deficiente protección legal 
conduce a las empresas a distribuir ratios de dividendos más elevados como una forma de 
sustituir las carencias del entorno (the substitute hyphotesis). Ambas hipótesis han recibido 
considerable apoyo empírico en distintos lugares y momentos.  
Combinando los distintos planteamientos teóricos anteriormente esbozados, cabe 
preguntarse si la incidencia de los impuestos en las decisiones financieras puede venir modelada 
por el nivel de protección de que gozan los accionistas. En otras palabras, surge la cuestión 
sobre las relaciones entre la información transmitida por las decisiones financieras en 
situaciones de escasa protección legal y el efecto de los impuestos sobre dichas decisiones. 
Todo ello pone de manifiesto la conveniencia de analizar conjuntamente los mecanismos de 
gobierno corporativo y los impuestos al investigar las políticas financieras.   




En paralelo a esas investigaciones, existe otra línea de trabajo que ha estudiado la 
interacción entre el entorno institucional y la estructura financiera de la empresa, mostrando 
cómo la calidad de las prácticas de gobierno corporativo influye en la relación entre impuestos 
y decisiones de endeudamiento. De acuerdo con esta visión, las posibles transferencias de 
recursos entre accionistas y acreedores se traducen en variaciones de los flujos sometidos a 
gravamen. Y, dado que el entorno institucional modifica la posibilidad de tales transferencias, 
se establece una concatenación entre los tres elementos (impuestos, entorno legal y política 
financiera) que aconseja su estudio conjunto. Partiendo de los fundamentos teóricos 
anteriormente esbozados, la presente tesis doctoral trata de realizar un análisis de la política de 
dividendos y de la estructura de capital de las empresas brasileñas. De alguna manera, por 
paradójico que parezca, una tesis doctoral es el resultado del trabajo individual del doctorando 
y de la impronta que en él dejan sus directores, profesores y compañeros en el Programa de 
Doctorado. Por consiguiente, no debe extrañar que la presente tesis doctoral se inscriba en un 
campo de las finanzas corporativas roturado por profesores del Programa de Doctorado 
Interuniversitario en Investigación en Economía de la Empresa. Al escribir estas páginas es 
inevitable evocar anteriores tesis doctorales como la de los profesores Valentín Azofra 
Palenzuela sobre los factores explicativos de la estructura de capital de las empresas españoles, 
Alberto de Miguel Hidalgo sobre la interrelación de las decisiones de inversión, financiación y 
dividendos, Juan Antonio Rodríguez Sanz sobre la estructura de propiedad o Chabela de la 
Torre e Ignacio Requejo sobre la influencia de la estructura de propiedad en la estrategia 
financiera de la empresa. Se entiende así la elección del tema de investigación, con el cual he 
tratado de beneficiarme del conocimiento de quienes me han precedido y, al mismo tiempo, dar 
un paso adelante en la senda del conocimiento. 
La elección de Brasil no es caprichosa sino que este país constituye un caso único para 
el estudio conjunto de los efectos impositivos e institucionales sobre las decisiones 




empresariales ya que, a pesar de ofrecer una protección legal relativamente escasa a los 
accionistas minoritarios y adolecer de ciertas carencias en términos de gobierno corporativo, en 
los últimos años ha realizado un considerable esfuerzo para mejorar la calidad de su entorno 
institucional al mismo tiempo que ha implementado notables cambios en su ordenamiento 
fiscal. Ambas actuaciones tienen mutuas implicaciones y constituyen una oportunidad única 
para avanzar en nuestro conocimiento sobre el tema.  
Así, la Bolsa de Valores del Estado de Sao Paulo (B3), la Bolsa de Valores oficial de 
Brasil, creó en el año 2000 el denominado Novo Mercado (NM) a fin de compensar la deficiente 
protección de los accionistas minoritarios. Las empresas que voluntariamente deseaban 
adherirse están obligadas a adoptar prácticas de gobierno corporativo más estrictas que las 
exigidas por la legislación nacional. Este proceso está basado en la idea de “convergencia 
funcional” planteada por Coffee (1999), según la cual, en los países con carencias 
institucionales, han de ser los mercados de capitales quienes tomen la iniciativa en la adopción 
de medidas de mejora del gobierno corporativo dadas las dificultades de reforma de la 
legislación nacional. 
Con el objetivo de conceder a las empresas cierto margen de tiempo para mejorar 
gradualmente su funcionamiento hasta que se encontraran en condiciones de cumplir las 
exigencias del NM, la B3 también creó los mecanismos de seguimiento denominados Nivel 1 
y Nivel 2, que no son sino categorías intermediarias de adopción de prácticas de gobierno 
corporativo más estrictas que las requeridas por la legislación brasileña y, a la vez, menos 
exigentes que las del NM.  
De esta forma, el mercado brasileño constituye un entorno único para el estudio de los 
efectos del gobierno corporativo en las decisiones financieras de las empresas al reunir 
compañías que, a pesar de estar sujetas al mismo marco institucional, están expuestas a 
exigencias distintas de gobierno corporativo. Por consiguiente, la presente tesis doctoral evita 




que los resultados y conclusiones se encuentren sesgados por las diferencias institucionales y 
culturales entre países. Asimismo, el caso brasileño permite valorar hasta qué punto una 
reforma llevada a cabo en un mercado bursátil -y que no contó con el apoyo de cambios 
legislativos nacionales-, puede llegar a sustituir o enmendar las deficiencias institucionales del 
conjunto del país.  
Otro aspecto institucional en el que profundizamos en esta tesis doctoral está 
relacionado con la influencia de la legislación tributaria brasileña en las decisiones financieras 
de las empresas. En concreto, Brasil es el único país emergente que ha implementado un sistema 
de Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE), llamado de “intereses sobre el capital propio (en 
inglés, interest on equity - IOE)”, cuya finalidad es reducir el sesgo fiscal de la deuda (en inglés, 
debt tax bias), o sea, la discriminación impositiva generada por la diferencia en el tratamiento 
fiscal dado al uso de la deuda y del capital propio, al permitir a las empresas deducir una tasa 
referencial de intereses (a notional interest rate) por el uso de los recursos propios y no 
solamente por el uso de la deuda.  
Una característica peculiar del IOE, es que las empresas sólo pueden disfrutar de 
deducciones fiscales cuando distribuyen parte de sus recursos propios a los accionistas. Así, el 
IOE constituye una clara alternativa al payout y, a pesar de presentar características y funciones 
bastante similares a los dividendos -como, por ejemplo, su utilidad para reducir los conflictos 
de agencia, para señalizar oportunidades de inversión, para atraer accionistas que valoran la 
sensación de seguridad, y para ofrecer liquidez- su tratamiento fiscal presenta grandes 
diferencias, puesto que, al considerarse un gasto financiero, puede ser deducido en el balance 
de la empresa antes del cálculo de los impuestos, generando de esta manera una deducción 
fiscal. En cambio, en el caso de los dividendos, la base imponible viene determinada por el 
beneficio neto ajustado, sin que la empresa pueda obtener deducciones fiscales por la 
distribución de dividendos.  




El tratamiento fiscal de las rentas personales también es diferente para los dividendos y 
para el IOE. Mientras que los accionistas se encuentran exentos de impuestos cuando reciben 
dividendos, no sucede lo mismo cuando la retribución procede de IOE, estando sujetos a una 
imposición cuyo gravamen varía de acuerdo con el tipo de accionista beneficiario. Por lo tanto, 
las ventajas fiscales derivadas del uso de IOE dependen no solo de la estructura de capital de la 
empresa sino también de su estructura de propiedad. Ese rasgo abre la puerta a plantearnos si 
la importancia de las consideraciones fiscales en la política de payout puede hallarse 
condicionada por la identidad de los accionistas de la empresa. Del mismo modo, la existencia 
del IOE permite a las empresas disponer de un escudo fiscal alternativo a la deuda, con menores 
costes de quiebra y que también conserva las características no fiscales de la deuda, como, por 
ejemplo, su efecto señalizador o su capacidad para para mitigar los conflictos de agencia.  
En función del marco descrito anteriormente, el objetivo principal de esta tesis doctoral 
es analizar -utilizando la idiosincrasia del marco institucional brasileño-, la influencia del 
gobierno corporativo, de los impuestos y de la estructura de propiedad en las decisiones de 
distribución de ca y de estructura de capital de las empresas. Ese objetivo general se concreta 
en dos objetivos más específicos: 
1- Analizar si y cómo la incorporación al NM afecta a la política de dividendos y a 
la estructura de capital de las empresas brasileñas. 
2- Partiendo de la relevancia de los impuestos en las decisiones de payout y de 
estructura de capital de las empresas, analizar el papel moderador de la estructura de 
propiedad en dicha relación. 
Esta secuencia de objetivos vertebra la estructura de la tesis doctoral. Así, tras esta 
introducción, en el capítulo 2 nos planteamos el efecto de la incorporación al NM sobre las 
decisiones de financiación y de dividendos. En este capítulo se describen las características del 
ambiente institucional brasileño y la reforma emprendida por la B3 para mejorar la protección 




de los inversores a través de la creación de diferentes niveles de mercado. A continuación 
verificamos si y de qué forma la incorporación al NM y a los niveles intermedios afecta a las 
decisiones de dividendos y de financiación empresarial, ambos como mecanismos empleados 
por las empresas para mitigar sus conflictos de agencia. 
A continuación, incorporamos las diferencias de tributación entre los dividendos y los 
intereses sobre el capital propio para estudiar el efecto moderador de la estructura de propiedad. 
Ese análisis se realiza en el capítulo 3, en el que detallamos las consecuencias fiscales del uso 
de dividendos y de IOE para empresas y accionistas y, posteriormente, verificamos si y cómo 
la identidad de los accionistas dominantes afecta a la relación entre impuestos y las decisiones 
de payout. Un estudio semejante se acomete en el capítulo 4, en el que se extiende el efecto del 
IOE a la estructura de capital. En dicho capítulo, exponemos las semejanzas entre la deuda y el 
IOE y también las diferencias en su tratamiento fiscal, las cuales dependen de la estructura de 
propiedad empresarial. Posteriormente, en ese capítulo analizamos el efecto de los impuestos 
en las decisiones de financiación incorporando el papel moderador de la identidad de los 
accionistas en esta relación.  
Se cierra esta tesis doctoral con un capítulo que contiene las principales conclusiones, 
se discuten los resultados desde una perspectiva crítica y se sugieren futuras líneas de trabajo. 
Para facilitar la visión de conjunto de nuestra investigación, en la Figura 1 proponemos un 
esquema simplificado. 
A modo de adelanto de nuestros resultados, encontramos que las empresas brasileñas 
voluntariamente incorporadas al NM distribuyen menos dividendos y se hallan menos 
endeudadas que las que operan en los demás segmentos de B3. Eso sugiere que el NM cumple 
una importante función y puede constituir un elemento que sustituye a otros mecanismos 
tendentes a mejorar la confianza entre empresas y accionistas, a saber, los dividendos y la 
deuda.  




Los resultados también indican que la incidencia de los impuestos en las decisiones de 
payout y de estructura de capital depende de la estructura de propiedad de las empresas. Hemos 
detectado que en las empresas con presencia predominante de accionistas individuales (o 
familiares) o con estructuras piramidales en su cadena de propietarios, los impuestos parecen 
ser un factor determinante de las decisiones de financiación o dividendos. Por el contrario, en 
empresas poseídas por accionistas institucionales, las consideraciones fiscales resultan 
irrelevantes de cara a la formulación de la política financiera.  
Dado lo anterior, nuestra tesis defiende que reformas realizadas en los mercados de 
capitales se erigen como un mecanismo alternativo a las deficiencias legales necesarias para 
mejorar las prácticas de buen gobierno y las tomas de decisiones empresariales. También 
defendemos que la importancia de los impuestos en las decisiones corporativas se ve afectada 
por la estructura de propiedad. Lo cual indica que, la efectividad de los esfuerzos emprendidos 










































The traditional financial theory proposes that the main objective of a company should 
be to maximize the wealth of its shareholders, which, in practice, means maximizing the market 
price of the securities they hold. This objective has generated an abundant literature and a wide 
controversy about the effects of financial decisions on the value of companies. In this sense, far 
from the situation of perfect markets analysed by Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani in their 
seminal works of 1958 and 1961, research in recent decades has shown the relevance of frictions 
in capital markets such as transaction costs, agency costs, bankruptcy costs or the taxes on the 
value of firms. In this context, there are many studies that have shown the tax consequences of 
the company's financial policies. From this perspective, the static trade-off theory establishes 
that the value of a company will reach its peak when the opposing effects of two forces are 
balanced: the tax deductibility of interest payments and the increase in bankruptcy costs 
associated with an increase of the level of debt. Likewise, dividends are also affected by the tax 
laws of the countries, given the different tax treatment of the distribution of cash compared to 
its retention. 
Within the imperfections of the financial markets, deserves special mention the agency 
theory approach, according to which dividends and debt can be effective instruments to reduce 
conflicts between the different stakeholders of the company. More specifically, the distribution 
of dividends or the increase of firm debt are believed to mitigate the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour into the firms as dividends and debt reduce the resources under managers’ control 
and are susceptible to be used in search of their interests and not to maximize the wealth of the 
investors.  
Precisely, the agency approach allows to incorporate informational asymmetries 
between insiders and outsiders, which endows the decisions of dividends and capital structure 
of a new function. Thus, these financial policies become signals that convey reliable 
information about the profitable investment opportunities available to the company. A feature 




of recent research in business finance and corporate governance is the international dimension 
that these studies have taken, addressing various institutional and legal environments. In this 
sense, the Law & Finance approach proposed by La Porta et al. (1999, 1997, 1998, 2000), 
according to which, two types of legal systems can be distinguished: countries whose legal 
systems come from the Anglo-Saxon or common law tradition tend to offer more adequate 
protection to investors than countries whose laws they are born in the context of civil or 
continental law. 
Taking this approach to the field of dividend policy, there are two hypotheses that 
explain the relationship between the legal structure of countries and the distribution of profits 
of companies. The first states that a legal system that offers adequate protection to investors 
boosts the distribution of dividends as a form of compensation for those shareholders (the 
outcome hypothesis). The alternative explanation raises that poor legal protection leads 
companies to distribute higher dividend ratios as a way to make up for the shortcomings of the 
environment (the substitute hypothesis). Both hypotheses have received considerable empirical 
support in different places and times. 
Combining the different theoretical approaches outlined above, it is worth asking 
whether the incidence of taxes on financial decisions can be modelled by the level of protection 
enjoyed by shareholders. In other words, the question arises about the relationships between the 
information transmitted by financial decisions in situations of low legal protection and the effect 
of taxes on such decisions. All this highlights the convenience of jointly analysing the 
mechanisms of corporate governance and taxes when investigating financial policies. 
In parallel with these investigations, there is another line of research that has studied the 
interaction between the institutional environment and the financial structure of the company, 
showing how the quality of corporate governance practices influences the relationship between 
taxes and indebtedness decisions. According to this view, the possible transfers of resources 




between shareholders and creditors are translated into variations in the flows subject to tax. 
And, given that the institutional environment modifies the possibility of such transfers, a 
concatenation is established between the three elements (taxes, legal environment and financial 
policy) that advise their joint study. Starting from the theoretical foundations previously 
outlined, this doctoral thesis seeks to perform an analysis of the dividend policy and the capital 
structure of Brazilian companies. Somehow, paradoxical as it may seem, a doctoral thesis is the 
result of the doctoral student's individual work and the imprint that his directors, professors and 
colleagues leave on the Doctorate Program. Therefore, it is not surprising that this doctoral 
thesis is inscribed in a field of corporate finance broken by professors of the Interuniversity 
Doctorate Program in Research in Business Economics. When writing these pages, it is 
inevitable to evoke previous doctoral theses such as that of professors Valentín Azofra 
Palenzuela on the explanatory factors of the capital structure of Spanish companies, Alberto de 
Miguel Hidalgo on the interrelation of investment decisions, financing and dividends, Juan 
Antonio Rodríguez Sanz on the ownership structure or Chabela de la Torre and Ignacio Requejo 
on the influence of the ownership structure on the company's financial strategy. This means the 
choice of research topic, with which I have tried to benefit from the knowledge of those who 
preceded me and, at the same time, take a step forward in the path of knowledge. 
The choice of Brazil is not capricious but this country is a unique case for the joint study 
of the tax and institutional effects on corporate decisions since, despite offering relatively little 
legal protection to minority shareholders and suffering from certain shortcomings in terms of 
corporate governance, in recent years it has made a considerable effort to improve the quality 
of its institutional environment while at the same time implementing significant changes in its 
fiscal order. Both actions have mutual implications and constitute a unique opportunity to 
advance our knowledge on the subject. 




Thus, in order to compensate for the deficient protection of minority shareholders the 
Stock Exchange of the State of Sao Paulo (B3), which is the official Stock Exchange of Brazil, 
created in 2000 the so-called Novo Mercado (NM). Companies voluntarily joining it are obliged 
to adopt corporate governance practices that are stricter than those required by national 
legislation. This process is based on the idea of "functional convergence" proposed by Coffee 
(1999), according to which, in countries with institutional deficiencies, due to the difficulties 
of reforming national legislation, it must be the capital markets that take the initiative in 
adopting government improvement measures. Aiming at granting companies a certain margin 
of time to gradually improve their operation until they were able to meet the requirements of 
the NM, the B3 launched the Level 1 and Level 2, which are intermediary categories with 
stricter requirements of corporate governance than those required by Brazilian legislation and, 
at the same time, less demanding than those of the NM. 
In this way, the Brazilian setting constitutes a unique environment for studying the 
effects of corporate governance on the financial decisions of companies by bringing together 
companies that, despite being subject to the same institutional framework, are exposed to 
different requirements of corporate governance. Therefore, the present doctoral thesis prevents 
the results and conclusions from being biased by institutional and cultural differences between 
countries. Likewise, the Brazilian case allows us to assess the extent to which a market-level 
reform that did not have the support of national legislative changes, can replace or amend the 
institutional deficiencies of the country as a whole. 
Another institutional aspect in which we deepen in this doctoral thesis is related to the 
influence of the Brazilian tax legislation in the financial decisions of companies. Specifically, 
Brazil is the only emerging country that has implemented a system of Allowance for Corporate 
Equity (ACE), called "interest on equity (IOE)", whose purpose is to allow companies to deduct 
a notional interest rate for the use of own resources and not only for the use of the debt. 




A peculiar feature of the IOE is that companies can only enjoy tax deductions by its use 
when they distribute part of their equity to shareholders. Thus, the IOE is a clear alternative to 
payout and, in spite of presenting features and functions quite similar to dividends, such as its 
usefulness to reduce agency conflicts, to signal investment opportunities, to attract shareholders 
who value the feeling of security, and to provide shareholders liquidity, its tax treatment 
presents great differences, since, when considered a financial expense, it can be deducted in the 
balance of the company before the calculation of taxes, thus generating a tax deduction. On the 
other hand, in the case of dividends, the tax base is determined by the adjusted net profit, 
without the company being able to obtain tax deductions for the distribution of dividends. 
The tax treatment of personal income is also different for dividends and for IOE. While 
shareholders are tax exempt when they receive dividends, they taxed on incomes from IOE and 
this tax varies according to the type of beneficiary shareholder. Therefore, the tax advantages 
derived from the use of IOE depend not only on the capital structure of the company but also 
on its ownership structure. This feature opens the door to consider whether the importance of 
fiscal considerations in the payout policy may be conditioned by the identity of the company's 
shareholders. In the same way, the existence of the IOE allows companies to have an alternative 
non-debt tax shield, with lower bankruptcy costs and that also retains the non-fiscal 
characteristics of the debt, such as, its signalling effect or its capacity to mitigate agency 
conflicts. 
Based on the framework described above, the main objective of this doctoral thesis is to 
analyse, using the idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian institutional framework, the influence of 
corporate governance, taxes and the ownership structure on dividends and capital structure 
decisions of companies. This general objective is specified in two more specific objectives: 
1- To analyze if and how the adoption of the NM affects the dividend policy and the 
capital structure of Brazilian companies. 




2- Based on the relevance of taxes in payout decisions and the capital structure of 
companies, to analyze the moderating role of the ownership structure in said relationship. 
This sequence of objectives structures this doctoral thesis. Thus, after this introduction, 
in Chapter 2 we consider the effect of the incorporation into the NM on financing and dividend 
decisions. This chapter describes the characteristics of the Brazilian institutional environment 
and the reform undertaken by B3 to improve the protection of investors through the creation of 
different market levels. Then, we verify if and how the incorporation to the NM and the 
intermediate levels affects the decisions of dividends and corporate financing, both as 
mechanisms used by companies to mitigate their agency conflicts. 
Next, we incorporate the differences in taxation between dividends and IOE to verify 
the moderating effect of firms’ ownership structure. This analysis is carried out in Chapter 3, 
in which we detail the tax consequences of the use of dividends and IOE for companies and 
shareholders and, subsequently, we verify whether and how the identity of the dominant 
shareholders affects the relationship between taxes and payout decisions. A similar study is 
undertaken in Chapter 4, in which the effect of the IOE on the capital structure is extended. In 
this chapter, we expose the similarities between leverage and the IOE and also the differences 
in their tax treatment, which depend on the ownership structure of firms. Subsequently, in this 
chapter we analyze the effect of taxes on financing decisions, incorporating the moderating role 
of the identity of the shareholders in this relationship. 
This doctoral thesis is closed with a chapter that contains the main conclusions, the 
results are discussed from a critical perspective and future lines of research are suggested. To 
facilitate the overview of our research, in Figure 1 we propose a simplified scheme. 
By way of advancement of our results, we find that Brazilian companies voluntarily 
incorporated into the NM distribute less dividends and are less leveraged than their counterparts 




operating in the other segments of B3. This suggests that the NM plays an important role and 
can be an element that replaces other mechanisms aimed at improving trust between companies 
and shareholders, namely, dividends and debt. 
The results also indicate that the incidence of taxes on payout and capital structure 
decisions depends on the ownership structure of the companies. We have detected that in 
companies with a predominant presence of individual (or family) shareholders or with 
pyramidal structures in their chain of owners, taxes seem to be a determining factor in financing 
or payout decisions. Contrariwise, in companies owned by institutional shareholders, fiscal 
considerations appear to be irrelevant in the formulation of financial policy. 
Given the above, this doctoral thesis posits that reforms undertaken in the capital 
markets stand as an alternative mechanism to overcome the legal deficiencies that prevent 
countries from improving the quality of the corporate governance. We also conclude that the 
importance of taxes in corporate decisions is affected by the ownership structure. This indicates 
that the effectiveness of the efforts undertaken to reduce the debt tax bias is conditioned by the 

































REGULATORY DUALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
TRUST-ENHANCING MECHANISM FOR DIVIDENDS 
AND DEBT: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL. 
  
  






Previous finance literature emphasizes the importance of dividends and corporate debt 
to alleviate conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986). From this perspective, distributing more dividends or 
increasing leverage in companies reduces the free cash flow that might otherwise be used for 
purposes detrimental to minority shareholder interests. In this sense, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) 
add that a country’s legal origin is of major importance vis-à-vis minority shareholder 
protection. These authors also find that common law countries evidence a higher distribution 
of dividends and attribute these results to the better protection provided by these countries to 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000). Later studies, however, have found mixed 
evidence on these issues (Chae et al. 2009; Boţoc and Pirtea, 2014; John et al. 2015; Athari et 
al. 2016), suggesting that the effects of the institutional setting on firms’ financial policies may 
be affected by questions other than their static legal origin.  
The present study focuses on Brazil, a French civil law country with many problems 
related to minority shareholder protection. Previous literature describes Brazil as a country with 
traditionally high levels of private control benefits and both weak legislation and firm-level 
governance (Black et al. 2012), high ownership concentration (Gorga, 2009), and inherent 
problems of information asymmetry (Moreiras et al. 2012). Nevertheless, in recent years, the 
Brazilian securities market has undergone many reforms in an effort to make it more attractive 
to investors. Most importantly, BM&FBovespa, the main Brazilian stock exchange, launched a 
voluntary reform programme comprising three segments with varying corporate governance 
requirements: Nível 1(Level 1; N1), Nível 2(Level 2; N2) and the Novo Mercado (New Market; 
NM). 




This voluntary reform is based on functional convergence (or regulatory dualism), 
namely, the notion that improvements in minority shareholder protection in countries 
displaying weak corporate governance must occur at the securities market level due to the 
difficulties associated with reforming laws in these countries (Coffee, 1999). However, the 
literature presents contrasting views on the effectiveness of functional convergence. Johnson 
and Shleifer (2000), for instance, point out that the lack of strong laws, an efficient judicial 
system, or a fair regulator reduce the possibility of enforcing contracts or laws and, thus, that 
investor protection remains low. 
In this context, the first research question we address is: i) how does inclusion in the 
NM impact on firms’ financial policies? Previous literature has documented that in addition to 
dividends and leverage, corporate governance mechanisms impact on many firms’ policies and 
characteristics such as their cash holdings (Dittmar et al. 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; 
Pinkowitz et al. 2006; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Durán et al. 2016), investment (Gugler, 2003; 
Honoré et al. 2015; McCahery et al. 2016), performance (Achim et al. 2016) and firm value 
(Fan and Yu, 2016). Therefore, we contend that if the NM strengthened minority shareholder 
protection, then it should affect other financial characteristics of Brazilian listed firms.   
After examining the effect of the NM on firms’ general characteristics, the second issue 
we address is ii) do Brazilian listed firms use the NM as a substitute for dividends and debt as 
trust-generating mechanisms? We conjecture that, if the NM were effective in improving 
minority shareholder protection, in line with previous literature, then it might also affect firms’ 
dividends and leverage policies. Thus, our second step is to investigate whether the NM has an 
outcome or a substitution effect on dividend policies and whether it affects the use of leverage 
by Brazilian listed firms.  
Results reveal a number of differences between NM-listed firms and their non-NM 
counterparts. Evidence also shows a negative effect of presence in the NM on both dividends 




and leverage. We also find that enlistment in the N1 or N2 has a negative influence on dividend 
distributions but that this effect is weaker than enlistment in the NM. Therefore, besides 
confirming the substitutional effect of BM&FBovespa corporate governance segments, it 
suggests that the more stringent the requirements of corporate governance practices, the fewer 
dividends shareholders require from firms. Moreover, N1 and N2 enlistment does not appear to 
affect firms’ leverage, suggesting that only the most stringent corporate governance practices, 
such as those required by the NM, influence firms’ capital structure decisions. 
This study contributes to corporate governance literature in several ways. First, we show 
that companies in Brazil use corporate governance as a commitment device to express their 
intent to take care of minority shareholders. Second, using the Brazilian background, we show 
that market-level reforms do indeed promote meaningful changes in company policies and help 
to improve minority shareholder protection. Third, we provide evidence that a country’s 
institutional framework can evolve over time, thereby challenging the view that minority 
shareholder protection is the result of a static legal origin, which is unable to change over the 
years.  
Finally, our investigation of the NM in Brazil, an emerging market, contributes to other 
emerging countries that display similar institutional features by providing evidence of the 
effectiveness of a mechanism aimed at enhancing corporate governance and developing market 
shares, and thus improving investor confidence. Since most prior literature uses US and Euro-
zone data, relatively little is known about dividend and leverage policies in emerging markets. 
Therefore, we add to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence for an emerging 
market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
characteristics of Brazil’s institutional framework and the Bovespa’s corporate governance 
lines of shares. This section also discusses the previous literature on dividend and leverage in 




order to identify the relation between them, and proposes the influence of the Brazilian context 
on such topics. Section III introduces the data and the specific empirical models used to test our 
hypothesis. Section IV presents the descriptive analysis and the results of the explanatory 
analysis. Finally, Section V provides our main conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1 Brazilian Institutional Framework 
 
Previous literature describes Brazil as having a low level of shareholder protection and 
a low level of development in its financial market in which companies face financial constraints 
when seeking to access external capital (Crisóstomo et al. 2014a). Aldrighi and Oliveira (2007) 
find a very high concentration of vote and cash flow rights in the hands of controlling 
shareholders and a predominant presence of family-controlled firms. Moreover, the so-called 
Olson Problem1 is rife in Brazil, where the overwhelming majority of listed firms are controlled 
by powerful blockholders opposed to creating conditions designed to improve minority 
shareholder protection and thus the development of the capital market (Gilson et al. 2011).  
However, Brazil has undertaken major structural reforms over the last couple of 
decades. Changes in legislation have bolstered external shareholder protection, and 
privatization of public companies commenced at the end of the last century, thus aiding the 
modernization of key sectors of the economy. In addition, a series of reforms known as the 
                                                          
1 Gilson et al. (2011) define the Olson problem as resistance led by established groups who, having achieved a 
position of financial success, often coupled with political influence under the existing regime, resist any reform 
aimed at improving minority shareholder protection since they believe it will jeopardise their position. 
 




Plano Real (Real Plan)2 created macroeconomic changes that led to a reduction in inflation, 
which, together with internal modifications in the main Brazilian stock market 
(BM&FBovespa), attracted new investors and helped it to develop. 
These adjustments, however, did not remove all the obstacles that inhibit the full 
development of Brazil’s stock market. Problems such as high interest rates and barriers related 
to minority shareholder protection persisted as did firms’ limited access to external capital, thus 
keeping Brazilian companies heavily dependent on banks. In order to ensure the rights of 
minority shareholders and reduce information asymmetry in the market, the Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange3 used its power of self-regulation4 to launch the NM in 2000. It exemplifies one case 
of regulatory dualism that aims to reduce the Olson Problem by allowing pre-listed firms to 
manage their business according to pre-existing legislation and allows for the existence of a 
parallel regime involving more rigorous standards of corporate governance, which is available 
to firms (pre-listing or new-listing companies) who wish to make use of it (Gilson et al. 2011).  
Companies voluntarily subscribing to the NM must adopt more stringent corporate 
governance practices following the important principles of effective market functioning. 
Bovespa also launched N1 and N2, intermediary segments that impose less demanding 
corporate governance requirements than the NM. The aim of N1 and N2 is to provide firms 
with time to gradually improve their corporate governance practices until they reach the 
required conditions of the NM (De Paula, 2006).  
                                                          
2 The Plano Real (Real Plan) is a series of measures aimed at stabilising domestic currency in nominal terms. It 
was enacted in 1994 and included the introduction of a new currency followed by a series of contracting fiscal and 
monetary policies. 
3 In 2008, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa Holding S.A.) and the Brazilian Mercantile and Futures 
Exchange (BM&F S.A.) merged. The new entity was called Nova Bolsa. Its name subsequently changed to 
BM&FBovespa.   
4 Law 6,385 (1976), §4⁰, Art. 21, endows the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange with the power of self-regulation. 
Therefore, the requirements of its corporate governance levels are not just recommendations (soft law), since non-
compliance with these requirements can result in transgressors being punished by the arbitral chamber.  




Table 1 shows the main differences between these lines of shares. In sum, according to 
Brazilian law (Law 10,303 [2001]), listed companies must keep at least 50% of their shares 
with voting rights. The NM requires firms to issue only ordinary shares. Whereas the law 
provides no definition of a minimum free float for listed companies, the NM requires companies 
to keep at least 25% of free float. The NM also imposes more conditions on representation and 
independence in the board of directors. Specifically, Brazilian law requires companies to keep 
at least three directors and does not require any of these to be independent. The NM requires 
the presence of at least five permanent board members, at least 20% of whom must be 
independent directors. Companies in the NM must also guarantee a tag-along5 of 100% in 
transfer control, compared to the Brazilian law requirement of 80%. In addition, by adopting 
the IFRS and US GAAP, the NM requires additional transparency measures. The NM also 
created the arbitration chamber, an entity with the power to arbitrate in issues concerning claims 
made by minority shareholders. Nível 1, Nível 2, and Novo Mercado all require firms to conduct 
at least one annual meeting between analysts and shareholders, to provide the company's annual 
calendar, to disclose contracts signed between the company and related parties, and to disclose 
transactions made by controlling shareholders. 
Donaggio (2012) notes that the aim of BM&FBovespa’s voluntary reforms is to attract 
foreign capital in order to boost the growth of the Brazilian stock market. To achieve this, 
BM&FBovespa sought to reduce the perception of risk for investors by implementing good 
corporate governance rules. The requirement to issue only ordinary shares in the NM points to 
the fair treatment awarded to minority shareholders, following the principle of one share - one 
vote. The 100% tag-along requirement is intended to reduce the disparity of rights between 
majority and minority shareholders since, at the time the NM was created, Brazilian legislation 
                                                          
5Tag-along is a mechanism which ensures that if the majority shareholder sells his/her stake, minority shareholders 
have the right to sell their shares under the same conditions as applied to controlling shareholders. 




allowed two-thirds of issuances to be preferred shares. A minimum free float requirement of 
25% is intended to improve market liquidity. The arbitral chamber uses experts in order to 
expedite decisions concerning conflicts in corporate matters.  
 
Table 1: BM&FBovespa Corporate Governance Levels 
Item Traditional 
Market 
Nível 1 (Level 1) Nível 2 (Level 2) Novo Mercado 
% of voting 
rights 
Voting and non-
voting shares are 
allowed 
Voting and non-
voting shares are 
allowed 
Voting and non-
voting shares are 
allowed 
Only voting right shares 
Minimum free 
float 
No rule Minimum of 25% of 
outstanding shares 
Minimum of 25% of 
outstanding shares 




At least three 
members 
At least three 
members 
At least three 
members 
At least, five effective 





ITRs, DFPs and 
IANs 
More requirements 
for ITRs, DFPs and 
IANs 
IFRS or US GAAP IFRS or US GAAP 
Tag Along 80% 80% 100% for ordinary 





Optional Optional Required Required 
Notes: This table presents the main differences between the levels of corporate governance launched by BM&FBovespa. The 
traditional market represents the requirements for companies that choose not to list themselves in any corporate governance 
level. Brazilian legislation requires ITRs (quarterly reports), DFPs (standardized financial statements), and IANs (annual 
reports) for public companies. In Nível 1, these reports must inform of any contracts signed between companies and related 
parties as well as transactions made by controlling shareholders. IFRS is the International Financial Reporting Standard and 
US GAAP is Generally Accepted Accounting Principles adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Tag-along 
rights allow minority shareholders to sell shares under conditions similar to any controlling shareholder deals. The arbitration 
chamber is a mechanism designed to resolve conflicts between minority shareholders and companies or controlling 
shareholders quickly and confidentially through specialized arbitrators. Companies in the Nível 2 and Novo Mercado are 
obligated to adopt the arbitration chamber, whereas traditional market and Nível 1 companies have the option either to adopt it 
or to resolve their conflicts through the ordinary justice system.  
 
Previous results have evidenced that BM&FBovespa’s voluntary reform succeeded in 
improving both the trading volume and liquidity of NM-listed firms (De-Carvalho and 
Pennacchi, 2012). Using an index that takes accounts of important elements of corporate 
governance (board structure, board procedure, related party transactions, ownership structure, 




shareholder rights and disclosure), Black et al. (2014) find that the NM enhanced the level of 
corporate governance in Brazil, which was reflected in positive investor reaction to these 
governance changes. Finally, Gilson et al. (2011) note that the NM contributed to the upsurge 
in truly widespread ownership as well as to changing the ownership structure of firms by 
decreasing the wedge between voting and cash flow rights.  
2.2 Dividends and the Novo Mercado 
Many prior studies have examined the effect of corporate governance on dividend 
decisions. For example, La Porta et al. (2000) posit two alternative hypotheses for the relation 
between dividend policy and shareholder rights. The first hypothesis states that the presence of 
an effective legal system allows shareholders to obtain higher levels of dividends; in other 
words, dividends are an outcome of effective legal protection for shareholders (the outcome 
hypothesis). The second hypothesis states that an ineffective legal system can lead companies 
to distribute more meaningful dividend ratios as a way of substituting for weak investor 
protection (the substitution hypothesis). These authors find that firms operating in countries 
which offer better legal protection for shareholders distribute higher dividend payouts 
compared to their counterparts in countries with poorer legal protection for minority 
shareholders, thus confirming the outcome hypothesis.  
Many other studies support the outcome hypothesis through the adoption of country-
level or firm-level corporate governance practices in payout policies. For instance, Djankov et 
al. (2008) construct an index to measure the legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation in 72 countries. They confirm that common law countries - due to the quality of 
transparency in negotiations and the emphasis on ex-ante litigation - provide stronger protection 
against expropriation compared to civil law based countries. Farinha (2003) finds a link 
between dividend policy and firms’ compliance with the Cadbury Code of Best Practices. Said 
author argues that better-governed firms use dividend policies more extensively and that legal 




environment and dividend policy complement each other. Francis et al. (2011) also find a 
positive relation between an internal governance index, adoption of antitakeover laws, and 
dividend distribution. 
Furthermore, many articles confirm the substitution hypothesis in environments other 
than the United Kingdom and the United States (O’Connor, 2006; Chae et al., 2009; Lam et al. 
2012; John et al. 2015; Athari et al. 2016). Fatemi and Bildik (2012) find that firms in civil law 
countries distribute more dividends than those in countries with higher shareholder protection. 
Boţoc and Pirtea (2014) confirm that firms in countries offering low investor protection 
distribute higher dividends regardless of firm risk. They attributed the extended use of dividends 
to firms’ desire to develop a good reputation. Finally, Mitton (2004) finds that dividends and 
corporate governance have a strong negative relation in civil law countries.  
Previous research shows that governance practices such as those required by the NM 
affect dividend policy. For instance, using a Russian sample, Liljeblom and Maury (2016), find 
that adopting US GAAP standards is negatively related to dividend payments. Using a Spanish 
sample, Díaz et al. (2008) find that ownership concentration and the proportion of voting and 
cash flow rights are related to dividend payments. In addition, prior studies find that the 
composition of the board of directors affects dividends (Urzúa-I., 2009; Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009). Brockman and Unlu (2009) find that the substitution model is related to poor disclosure 
environments; that is, in countries with higher information asymmetry, firms pay higher 
dividends. 
In the Brazilian context, we expect differences in corporate governance between the NM 
and its non-NM counterparts to have an impact on the level of payout distributions of 
BM&FBovespa’ listed firms. Two scenarios are possible: companies may either distribute more 
dividends as a result of their complying with NM corporate governance requirements, or there 




may be a reduction in dividend payment trends due to the trust being generated between 
companies and minority shareholders. Our first hypothesis thus reads as follows:  
H1a: The NM has a positive effect on the payout of firms. 
H1b: The NM has a negative effect on the payout of firms. 
2.3 Leverage policy and the NM 
In their pioneering study of the agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
leverage works as a disciplinary mechanism by forcing managers to have fixed obligations. In 
addition, Jensen (1986) argues that leverage forces companies to reduce cash flow that might 
otherwise be used to finance negative net present value projects. Agrawal and Knoebet (1996) 
underscore the importance of lenders for monitoring companies’ activities since the 
performance of borrowers affects lender capital. 
However, some previous literature has linked the effectiveness of leverage to the quality 
of governance practices. Clearly, if capital market institutions prove ineffective at preventing 
opportunistic behaviour, external blockholders can control more resources without diluting 
their control stake and can thus expropriate more easily via leverage. Ineffective corporate 
governance can therefore create an environment which is favourable to expropriation through 
related-party transactions and pyramidal structures (Faccio, 2001; Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009, 
Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011).  
Conversely, if capital market institutions are effective, two scenarios are possible. 
Higher levels of leverage can reduce agency conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders. That is, leverage can act as a disciplinary mechanism for managers. Likewise, 
higher standards of corporate governance can lead credit providers to reduce both collateral 
requirements (An et al. 2016) and also debt interests in loans as they can access information to 
assess borrowers’ ability to repay debt, which, in turn can reduce the cost of debt (Chen and 




Zhu, 2013; Lee et al. 2015). From this perspective, when there is good corporate governance, 
companies could prefer to maintain higher levels of debt in order to signal their intention not to 
expropriate investor wealth.  
Alternatively, previous literature has found that better corporate governance facilitates 
firms’ access to external capital, which positively affects the development of financial markets 
and firms’ growth due to a reduction in financial constraints (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
In turn, less financially constrained firms use less debt because they enjoy greater access to 
other sources of external capital (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006; Francis et 
al. 2013; Florackis et al. 2015). Consequently, if corporate governance reduces information 
asymmetry, both shareholders and managers would prefer lower debt levels because corporate 
governance replaces the disciplinary function of debt and allows less leveraged companies the 
freedom to handle greater cash holdings.  
Hence, we posit that, in the Brazilian context, listing in the NM raises two alternative 
hypotheses. In one scenario, the NM increases the debt levels of firms because it inhibits 
expropriation by controlling shareholders through debt. In the other, the NM facilitates trust 
and thus reduces participating firms’ use of debt due to increased access to external capital as 
well as insider preference for remaining free from the obligations of debt. Therefore, we state 
our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2a: NM has a positive effect on a firm’s financial leverage. 
H2b: NM has a negative effect on a firm’s financial leverage. 
 3. Empirical design 
3.1 Sample 
 
Our sample comprises listed Brazilian companies included in the Worldscope Thomson 
database for 2001 to 2012. This period covers the first 12 years of the NM and the years before 




Brazil’s current macroeconomic crisis, indicating that macroeconomic issues will not overly 
affect our results as in the crisis period. We drop firms with missing values in debt, total assets, 
and cash dividends. In addition, we omit financial firms due to their differences in corporate 
structure compared to the rest of the sample.  
Table 2: Detailed description of the Sample according to the BM&FBovespa’s Levels. 
Notes: This table presents the number of firms listed in each year of our sample period for each segment of the 
BM&FBovespa. 
 
After applying these conditions, our data is presented as an unbalanced panel consisting 
of 266 companies and 1,475 firm-year observations. The 12-year sample period includes many 
cases of delists, mergers, and acquisitions. Selecting only firms with the same number of 
observations would reduce the sample to an unacceptable size. Table 2 details the distribution 
of the sample according to each BM&FBovespa segment for each year of our sample period. 
3.2 Variables and models 
We use two measures for the dependent variables in all of the models performed. For 
dividends (DIV1), we use the payout ratio, measured as total cash dividends over total assets 
(Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Pindado et al. 2012; Lozano and Caltabiano, 2015) and total cash 







Novo Mercado TOTAL 
2001 92 07 01 00 100 
2002 94 08 04 02 108 
2003 86 13 03 02 104 
2004 87 15 06 06 114 
2005 76 16 06 10 108 
2006 71 17 06 15 109 
2007 77 18 05 34 134 
2008 77 15 06 35 133 
2009 75 17 06 43 141 
2010 78 12 05 47 142 
2011 68 16 06 50 140 
2012 105 10 05 22 142 
TOTAL 986 164 59 266 1,475 




total debt over total assets (Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Hernandez-Cánovas, 2016) 
and also as LEV2, measured as long term debt over total assets (Pindado et al. 2017). Cash 
holding (CASH) is measured as the sum of cash and short term investments over total assets. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Lozano and Caltabiano, 
2015).  
For investment opportunities (IO), we use the market to book ratio (Öztekin & Flannery, 
2012). We use ROA as a measure of profitability. This is measured by earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) over total assets (Pindado et al. 2008). The non-debt tax shield (NDTS) 
variable is measured by the difference between interest payable less interest paid over total 
assets (Ramirez et al. 2012). The effective tax rate (ETR) is the ratio of income tax over earnings 
before taxes (Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008). Investments (INV) is measured by capital 
expenditures over total assets. TANG represents tangible assets and is measured as tangible 
fixed assets over total assets. 
As regards the models used, we include dummy variables in each of them to test the 
effect of companies joining the BM&FBovespa levels of corporate governance on the 
dependent variables. Thus, NM is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is listed in the NM, 
and zero otherwise6, and N1N2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is listed in N1 or 
N2, and zero otherwise. Thus, in order to test our first hypothesis, in which the central issue is 
to explore the effect of inclusion in the NM on dividend distribution, we obtain our baseline 
model as detailed in Equation (1): 
 
DIVit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1NMit + 𝛽2N1N2it + 𝛽3LEVit + 𝛽4ROAit + 𝛽5IOit + 𝛽6CASHit + 𝛽7SIZEit + 
𝛽8INVit + dt + ηi + Ii + ϑit.         (1) 
                                                          
6 It is important to note that this variable can change over time. For instance, if a company was not listed in the 
NM in the period 2001 to 2006, NM would take the value zero. However, if the same company migrated to the 
NM in 2007, NM would be 1 after said year. 





The regressions can be affected by time-varying macroeconomic effects, since the 
macroeconomic set is not constant over time. We control this effect by using a time dummy 
variable, dt. We also include in the models the variable Ii, that represents the impact of the 
industry effect on our dependent variable because dividends and debt are strongly related to a 
company`s specific business area. In order to define it, we follow the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC)7 code. Finally, other factors not included in the mentioned variables are 
captured by random disturbance, ϑit.  
In order to test Hypothesis 2, in which we examine the effect of the NM on leverage 
policy, we define a firm’s leverage as a function of its most widely accepted determinants:  
 
LEVit = β0 + β1NMit + β2N1N2it + β3𝐃𝐈𝐕it  + β4𝐑𝐎𝐀it + 𝜷5𝐈𝐎it + 𝜷6𝐓𝐀𝐍𝐆it + β7SIZEit 
+ β8INVit + β9𝐍𝐃𝐓𝐒it + β10𝐄𝐓𝐑it + dt + ηi + Ii + ϑit.                     (2) 
 
The equations are first estimated with the OLS panel data estimator. We acknowledge 
that adopting the stringent practices of corporate governance required by the NM might not be 
a random event, since we noted that NM firms may evidence ex ante differences that make them 
more prone to enlist in the NM. Its observed effect on dividends and leverage may thus result 
from selection bias. We address this endogeneity risk by using the propensity score matching 
(PSM) method, which produces a control group that is as similar as possible to the treatment 
group based on firms’ characteristics. 
                                                          
7 The SIC code classifies companies according to the following categories: Agriculture, Forest and Fishing; 
Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services; 
Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; Services; Public Administration; and Non-
classifiable. 




 Following previous studies in finance (Boubakri et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2017), we select 
the optimal match based on the nearest neighbour technique (with replacement and common 
support). To determine the propensity score, we use the same set of variables described in 
section III.B. In sum, for our tests, the matching firm to each NM company should be in the 
same industry group, have the same sample years and the same nearest neighbour propensity 
score. Finally, our propensity score matched sample has 530 observations for the dividend 
models and 514 observations for the leverage models, equally distributed between NM and non-
NM firms for both models.  
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3: Summary statistics for the variables used in the models. 
Notes: this table provides the number of observations, means, standard deviations, and the values in first, second 
and third quartiles for all the variables used in the models.  
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the models. The mean 
values for the two variables of dividends are 0.033, 0.075. These values are higher than those 
found in studies that used Euro-zone or United Kingdom samples (Henry, 2011; Lozano and 
Caltabiano, 2015), and which are environments that apply greater minority shareholder 




DIV1 1,475 0.033 0.055 0.00 0.800 
DIV2 1,475 0.075 0.134 -0.640 1.654 
LEV1 1,475 0.288 0.189 0.00 1.428 
LEV2 1,475 0.177 0.152 0.00 1.411 
IO 1,475 0.947 0.928 0.023 8.611 
SIZE 1,475 6.800   1.645 1.021 11.757 
CASH 1,471 0.130 0.120 0.00 0.744 
ROA 1,475 0.107 0.142 -2.387 1.258 
INV 1,475 0.060 0.060 0.00 0.670 
ETR 1,475 0.282 0.384 -0.497 4.982 
TANG 1,429 0.514 0.222 0.053 1.000 
NDTS 1,475 43.243 87.242 -0.045 597.960 




protection compared to Brazil. This suggests that firms in Brazil rely heavily on dividends as a 
trust-enhancing mechanism.  
The mean values of the leverage variables (0.288 and 0.177) are lower than the leverage 
values of studies carried out in developed countries (Henry, 2011; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 
2011; Jacob and Michaely, 2017). This might imply either that Brazilian companies rely less 
on debt as an agency mitigating device or that Brazilian firms face higher financial constraints 
when accessing the debentures market. 
 Table 4: t-tests 
Notes: this table provides the t-test for the variables used in the models. Columns 2 and 3 show the observations 
for non-NM and NM firms, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 show the means of each variable for non-NM and NM 
firms. Column 6 shows the differences of the means (column 4 – column 5) as well as the significance of such 
differences. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4 presents a preliminary analysis of the differences between non-NM firms and 
NM firms based on a test of difference of means for the variables used in the models. It shows 
that NM-firms keep higher cash holdings, suggesting there is confidence that insiders will not 
use internal funds for private-benefit projects. NM-firms also present less collateral (TANG), 
indicating they have fewer safeguards to offer investors and creditors. Thus, they adopt the NM 
as a trust-enhancing tool that helps them finance their projects and disgorge fewer dividends. 
Variable # Non-NM obs. 
(1) 








DIV1 1,209 266 0.033 0.032 0.001 
DIV2 1,209 266 0.076 0.070 0.006 
LEV1 1,209 266 0.285 0.301 -0.016 
LEV2 1,209 266 0.172 0.198 -0.026*** 
IO 1,209 266 0.796 1.623 -0.833*** 
SIZE 1,209 266 6.752 7.015 -0.263*** 
CASH 1,205 266 0.120 0.172 -0.052*** 
ROA 1,209 266 0.108 0.100 0.008 
INV 1,209 266 0.057 0.070 -0.013*** 
TANG 1,165 264 0.537 0.416 0.120*** 
ETR 1,209 266 0.276 0.308 -0.032 
NDTS 1,209 266 44.806 36.142 8.664* 




Firms listed in the NM are larger, have more growth opportunities and display a higher rate of 
investment. These results reveal that joining the NM affects companies’ internal policies. 
However, as NM firms differ from their non-NM counterparts in many aspects for which a 
univariate analysis does not control, we cannot conclude whether or not differences in the ratios 
analysed are due to differences in other firm-level characteristics.  
4.2 Baseline Results 
After detailing the descriptive statistics, we conducted multivariate analysis to test the 
hypothesis set out. As seen in Table 5, the empirical evidence confirms that, ceteris paribus, 
presence in the NM has a negative relationship with dividend distribution. This negative 
relationship confirms Hypothesis 1b, which predicts that an improvement in corporate 
governance in Brazil should have a negative effect on payout distributions. These results are 
consistent with the substitute model proposed by La Porta et al. (2000) and are in line with prior 
research that reports a substitutional use of dividends to make up for weak corporate governance 
(Mitton, 2004; Fatemi and Bildik, 2012; Boţoc and Pirtea, 2014). These findings suggest that 
adopting certain corporate governance practices such as those required by the NM has a negative 
effect on payout distributions (Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009; Liljeblom 
and Maury, 2016). 
The results also reveal a negative effect of the presence in N1 and N2 on dividends. This 
result suggests that enlistment in the intermediary lines of corporate governance is also used by 
firms as an alternative trust-enhancing mechanism to dividends. The N1N2 coefficients are, 
however, smaller than those for the NM. Therefore, besides confirming the substitutional effect 
of NM enlistment on dividends, these results suggest that the more stringent the corporate 
governance requirements which firms adopt, the fewer dividends shareholders require from 
firms. 




Table 5: Estimations results with Pooled OLS and PSM method. 
Notes: This table reports the results of regressions for the responsiveness of the treatment variable (NM) and the 
control variables on the dividend payouts. Columns (1) – (3) employ Pooled OLS method and Columns (2) – (4) 
employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
As regards the control variables, bigger firms are positive related to dividends. The 
relation between dividends and investment opportunities is also significant and positive. This 
result is in line with previous findings in Brazil and confirms the signalling function of 
dividends about future growth opportunities (Lozano and Catalbiano, 2015).  
The relation between dividends and leverage is negative, confirming that both 
governance mechanisms substitute for each other. The relation between the second measure of 
dividends (total cash dividends over total equity) and leverage, however, is positive. This 
relation is not surprising given that total assets accounts for firms’ liabilities while total equity 
does not. It suggests that a firm’s liabilities have a negative effect on the relation between 








Matching   
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
NMjt -0.0190*** -0.0176***  -0.0507*** -0.0413*** 
 (0.00343) (0.00383)  (0.00885) (0.00988) 
N1N2jt -0.00694** 0.00227  -0.0281*** -0.00858 
 (0.00342) (0.0200)  (0.00881) (0.0516) 
SIZEit 0.00134* 0.00370**  0.00500** 0.0102*** 
 (0.000784) (0.00145)  (0.00202) (0.00375) 
IOit 0.0207*** 0.0198***  0.0447*** 0.0373*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00161)  (0.00365) (0.00416) 
LEV1it -0.0319*** -0.0455***  0.0419** 0.0197 
 (0.00632) (0.0110)  (0.0163) (0.0285) 
CASHit -0.0130 -0.0526***  0.0126 -0.103** 
 (0.0101) (0.0163)  (0.0261) (0.0422) 
INVit -0.0293 -0.0346  -0.0719 -0.0595 
 (0.0193) (0.0259)  (0.0497) (0.0667) 
ROAit 0.152*** 0.0784***  0.362*** 0.212*** 
 (0.00858) (0.0112)  (0.0221) (0.0289) 
Constant -0.000977 0.00916  -0.0491 0.000302 
 (0.0140) (0.0222)  (0.0360) (0.0572) 
Observations 1,471 530  1,471 530 
R2 0.430 0.694  0.363 0.596 




dividends and leverage. As expected, profitability have a positive effect on current dividends 
(Brav et al. 2005).  
The results of the leverage model, reported in Table 6, show a negative relation between 
NM listing and corporate leverage for the two measures used for the dependent variable. This 
finding confirms Hypothesis 2b, which states that the NM should reduce companies’ financial 
leverage. Given the capital and ownership structure of Brazilian firms, this may have at least 
three implications. First, from an agency theory perspective, debt can be used as a disciplinary 
mechanism by forcing companies to reduce the free cash flow available for managers (Jensen, 
1986). NM might therefore reduce companies’ use of leverage to mitigate agency conflicts. The 
NM thus works as a substitutive monitoring device to leverage.  
Second, the improvement in corporate governance provided by the NM may inhibit 
possible opportunistic behaviours. Therefore, listing in the NM reduces the use of debt by 
preventing shareholders from expropriating through related-party transactions. Third, in line with 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), NM might also facilitate firms’ access to external capital, 
reducing firms’ financial constraints and, consequently, the cost of equity (Zhu, 2014). In turn, 
the NM leads companies to rely less on debt because it replaces the latter’s disciplinary function 
and gives firms freedom to handle larger cash holdings. 
 In contrast, the N1N2 variable does not appear to have a significant effect on leverage. 
It suggests that, since both N1 and N2 require companies to adopt less stringent corporate 
governance practices compared to the NM, enlistment in these segments does not prove to be 
effective at either reducing shareholder perception of agency risks or vis-à-vis mitigating the 
level of financial constraints that firms face. These results indicate that the substitutional effect 
of corporate governance on debt depends on how strict corporate governance practices are.  




Table 6: Estimations results with Pooled OLS and Propensity Score Matching method. 
 
Total Debt/Total Assets 
 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




 (0.0144) (0.0174) (0.0112) (0.0141) 
N1N2jt -0.00165 0.0394 7.26e-05 -0.0407 
 (0.0143) (0.0713) (0.0111) (0.0578) 
DIVit -0.526*** -0.426 -0.209** -0.672*** 
 (0.110) (0.289) (0.0852) (0.234) 
ROAit -0.211*** -0.818*** -0.0668** -0.235*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0762) (0.0305) (0.0618) 
IOit 0.0449*** 0.0353*** 0.0266*** 0.0188** 
 (0.00616) (0.00935) (0.00477) (0.00757) 
TANGit 0.0755*** 0.152*** 0.102*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0428) (0.0183) (0.0347) 
SIZEit 0.0357*** 0.0421*** 0.0415*** 0.0409*** 
 (0.00365) (0.00712) (0.00283) (0.00577) 
INVit 0.0787 0.113 0.173*** 0.137 
 (0.0817) (0.117) (0.0633) (0.0946) 
NDTSit -0.000208*** -8.25e-05 -0.000190*** -0.000160 
 (6.40e-05) (0.000140) (4.96e-05) (0.000114) 
ETRit -0.0151 -0.00593 0.00459 0.0299** 
 (0.0121) (0.0163) (0.00934) (0.0132) 
Constant 0.109* -0.00826 -0.0976** -0.186** 
 (0.0594) (0.0985) (0.0460) (0.0798) 
Observations 1,429 514 1,429 514 
R2 0.188 0.474 0.257 0.328 
Notes: This table reports the results of regressions for the responsiveness of the treatment variable (NM) and the 
control variables on leverage decisions. Columns (1) – (3) employ Pooled OLS method and Columns (2) – (4) 
employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
As regards the control variables for the leverage models, dividends and the dependent 
variable appear to have a negative relationship. ROA also has a negative effect on leverage, 
suggesting that more profitable firms generate more internal resources to finance their activities 
and, consequently, rely less on debt. Firms with higher investment opportunities have a higher 
leverage because they need to finance their projects. In addition, firms with higher collateral 
evidence more guarantees to creditors, justifying the positive relation between tangibility and 
leverage. This is also why size and leverage have a positive relationship. As expected, firms that 
can achieve tax savings through alternative tax shields (NDTS) rely less on debt. Finally, results 
show that companies who are expected to present higher tax burdens (ETR) have a positive 




influence on indebtedness. This result is not surprising, since the interests on debt allow firms to 
reach tax savings. 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
We also estimate all the models using an instrumental variable method. According to 
Ogaki (1993), the most appropriate method is the generalized method of moments (GMM) since 
it encompasses all other instrumental variable methods as special cases. Specifically, we use 
the system GMM proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) as the most reliable method. 
Furthermore, previous literature supports the use of system GMM to address the dynamics of 
dividends and leverage (Henry, 2011; Pindado et al. 2012; Keasey et al. 2015). The system 
GMM uses the lagged values of the independent variables as instruments, which are highly 
correlated to the variables they instrument. Therefore, this method is well suited to solving the 
endogeneity problem.   
Following Blundell and Bond (1998), we use each right-hand side variable in the models 
as instruments, lagged one to four times for equations in differences (except for lagged 
dividends, whose instruments are lagged two to five times) and just once in the level equations 
and only one instrument, t, for equations in levels. We also controlled for dynamic effects by 
including a lag of the dependent variables in the models. 
We also perform some tests to check potential misspecifications of the models. First, 
we used the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions to test the absence of correlation between 
the instruments and the error term. The results support the validity of the instruments in all the 
models used. Second, following Arellano and Bond (1991), we use the m2 statistic to test the 
lack of second-order serial correlation in the first difference residual. Results show there are no 
such problems in the models used.  
 




Table 7: Robustness checks with System GMM method. 
Notes: This table reports the results of regressions for the responsiveness of the treatment variable (NM) and the control 
variables on dividend payouts [Columns (1)-(2)] and leverage decisions [Columns (3)-(4)]. M2 is a serial correlation test of 
second order using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. Standard errors are in parentheses for the intercept and all variables. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Finally, we retain firms with at least five consecutive years of valid data because this 
condition is necessary to test for the absence of second-order correlation for the system GMM 
 Robustness checks 
 
Total Cash dividend/ 
Total Assets 
Total Cash dividends/ 
Total Equity 
 Total Debt/ 
Total Assets 
Long Term Debt/  
Total Assets 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NM -0.0135*** -0.0304***  -0.0277** -0.0284** 
 (0.00364) (0.00755) (0.0122) (0.0110) 
N1N2 -0.00749* -0.0298*** -0.0268 -0.0168 
 (0.00408) (0.00940) (0.0180) (0.0167) 
DIVi,t-1 0.432*** 0.467***   
 (0.0241) (0.0142)   
LEVi,t-1   0.732*** 0.717*** 
   (0.0272) (0.0273) 
SIZEit 0.000762 0.00624** 0.0117** 0.0464*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00315) (0.00531) (0.00566) 
IOit 0.0217*** 0.0399*** 0.00460 0.00456 
 (0.00201) (0.00355) (0.00383) (0.00310) 
DIVit   -0.185 -0.0656 
   (0.121) (0.0894) 
LEVit -0.00552 0.0337   
 (0.00730) (0.0286)   
CASHit 0.0314*** 0.109***   
 (0.00940) (0.0320)   
INVit 0.0338*** 0.0973*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0320) (0.0607) (0.0526) 
ROAit 0.0350*** 0.0747*** -0.264*** -0.147*** 
 (0.00895) (0.0222) (0.0393) (0.0138) 
TANGit   -0.0704** 0.0176 
   (0.0287) (0.0234) 
NDTSit   -5.15e-05 -0.00021*** 
   (3.53e-05) (3.73e-05) 
ETRit   -0.0257*** 0.00995* 
   (0.00486) (0.00560) 
Constant -0.00963 -0.0532*** 0.103*** -0.232*** 
 (0.00667) (0.0170) (0.0392) (0.0358) 
M2 1.23 0.89 0.72 -1.23 
 (0.218) (0.376) (0.474) (0.219) 
Hansen 61.88 51.11 53.02 70.11 
 (0.274) (0.624) (0.835) (0.310) 
Observations 934 934  912 912 
Firms 129 129  129 129 




methodology. Consequently, the sample used for the GMM models comprises 129 companies 
and 1,063 firm-year observations. Results confirm our finding with OLS and PSM methods for 
the interest variable and the explanatory variables for both the dividend and the leverage model. 
5. Conclusions 
 
This research explores the effects of a market-level reform led by the BM&FBovespa 
that introduced segments with stricter corporate governance requirements aimed at reducing the 
traditional problems inherent in Brazilian law concerning minority shareholder protection. To 
do so, we first verify whether the NM – the segment enforcing more stringent corporate 
governance practices – impacts on firms’ financial characteristics. Previous studies have 
reported that improving corporate governance affects a number of firm-related issues. We thus 
contend that, if the NM were to strengthen protection of minority shareholders in firms, it 
should be reflected in their internal functioning.  
As a second step, we investigate whether the NM has an outcome or a substitution effect 
on dividend policies, and whether it affects the use of leverage by Brazilian listed firms. We 
conjecture that, were the NM to prove effective in improving minority shareholder protection, 
then it might impact on firms’ dividend and leverage policies. We find that NM firms pay out 
fewer dividends than non-NM firms. These results suggest that companies use the NM as a 
trust-generating mechanism that mitigates concerns about minority shareholder wealth 
expropriation in Brazilian listed firms. Consequently, the NM reduces shareholders’ demands 
for dividends.  
Moreover, our findings reveal that NM firms are less leveraged than their non-NM 
counterparts. It suggests the NM plays a monitoring role that reduces firms’ use of debt as a 
disciplinary mechanism or/and reduces the use of debt by controlling shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders through related party transactions. Likewise, it is possible 




that voluntary enlistment facilitates firms’ access to external capital, thus reducing firms’ use 
of debt.  
We also check to see whether firms’ enlistment in N1 or N2, which are intermediary 
corporate governance segments of BM&FBovespa with less rigorous corporate governance 
requirements, affects firms’ dividend and leverage decisions. Results show that firms joining 
the N1 or N2 reduce the use of dividends albeit in a less evident way than NM listing does. It 
suggests that the more stringent corporate governance practice requirements are, the fewer 
dividends shareholders require from firms. N1 and N2 enlistment, however, does not 
significantly affect firms’ capital structure policy. We, therefore, contend that these segments 
are not sufficiently effective to replace the agency function of leverage or to mitigate firms’ 
financial constraints when accessing external equity. 
This research provides new insights into the corporate governance area by showing that 
functional convergence can work as an effective mechanism to make up for poor country-level 
investor protection. In other words, changes in regulations at the securities market level can 
improve corporate governance in these countries. The results also provide evidence that a 
country’s institutional environment can evolve over time, thus reducing the impact of legal 
origin as the main determinant of the quality of minority shareholder protection.  
An additional insight concerns the institutional setting. Specifically, we add to the scant 
literature on corporate governance and finance in emerging markets by providing evidence for 
a setting other than the more developed countries. We contribute to this line of research by 
analysing how voluntary reform in an emerging market affects firm specific decisions such as 
dividend distributions and leverage levels.  
Our findings prove useful to practitioners and policy makers alike. Our results indicate 
that investors can benefit from enlisting a firm in the NM since adherence to stricter corporate 




governance guidelines leads to a reduction in information asymmetries between a firm’s 
controllers and minority shareholders. For policy makers, our results indicate that efforts to 
improve corporate governance in securities markets can boost investor participation and reduce 
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1. Conclusiones  
 
En esta tesis doctoral hemos analizado la influencia del gobierno 
corporativo, del marco fiscal y de la estructura de propiedad empresarial en las 
decisiones de distribución de beneficios y de estructura de capital de las 
empresas. Para alcanzar este objetivo, utilizamos el marco institucional 
brasileño pues presenta dos características específicas que le hacen un entorno 
ideal para este estudio: la existencia de distintos segmentos en la Bolsa de 
Valores de Brasil y el denominado interés sobre los fondos propios.  
Por lo que se refiere a la primera de ellas, la Bolsa de Sao Paulo (B3) 
está formada por cuatro segmentos con distintos niveles de exigencia de 
gobierno corporativo. El segmento con unos requisitos más estrictos es el 
denominado Nuevo Mercado (NM), al que le siguen los Niveles 1 y 2. La 
creación de estos segmentos está inspirada en el concepto de convergencia 
funcional, según el cual, en los países con carencias institucionales, han de ser 
los mercados de capitales quienes tomen la iniciativa en la adopción de 
medidas de mejora del gobierno corporativo dadas las dificultades de reforma 
a las que se enfrenta la legislación nacional. Finalmente, las empresas que 
deciden no incorporarse a las prácticas más exigentes de gobierno corporativo 
están incluidas en la categoría del mercado tradicional que sigue prácticas de 
gobierno establecidas por la legislación nacional, las cuales tienen menos nivel 
de exigencia que las restantes líneas de gobierno corporativo. 




La segunda característica específica, es la existencia de un sistema de 
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE), titulado el interés sobre los fondos 
propios (en inglés, interest on equity IOE), lo cual es una herramienta que 
permite a las empresas deducir fiscalmente una tasa referencial de intereses por 
el empleo de los recursos propios. Por tanto, a pesar de ser un mecanismo de 
reparto del beneficio empresarial con características parecidas a los 
dividendos, presenta un tratamiento fiscal notablemente distinto. Dada la 
deducibilidad de los intereses por el uso del capital propio, el IOE constituye 
un escudo fiscal alternativo a la deuda, lo cual tiene implicaciones en las 
decisiones de estructura de capital de las empresas y también en el uso de otros 
escudos fiscales alternativos (EFAD). 
La presente tesis se puede estructurar en dos partes distintas, con las 
cuales tratamos de abordar dos objetivos. El primero es analizar si y cómo la 
incorporación a los segmentos alternativos de gobierno corporativo de la Bolsa 
de Brasil afecta a las políticas de dividendos y de estructura de capital de las 
empresas cotizadas. Para alcanzar este propósito, en el primer trabajo, titulado 
“Dualismo regulatorio como un mecanismo alternativo a los dividendos y la 
deuda para la creación de confianza: la evidencia brasileña”, examinamos el 
efecto de los distintos segmentos de gobierno corporativo en las características 
internas de las empresas. Posteriormente, estudiamos si la incorporación al NM 
o a los segmentos intermedios de la Bolsa tiene un efecto complementario o 




sustitutivo en las decisiones de reparto de dividendos y si esa incorporación 
afecta a las decisiones de financiación de las empresas.  
El segundo objetivo consiste en analizar si la estructura de propiedad 
empresarial tiene un papel moderador en la relación entre impuestos y las 
políticas de payout y de estructura de capital de las empresas. Para alcanzar 
este objetivo, exponemos en el segundo trabajo, titulado “La Relación entre 
Impuestos y Política de Payout: el Impacto del Tipo de Accionista”, las 
consecuencias fiscales del uso de dividendos y de IOE relacionándolas con la 
identidad dominante entre los accionistas de las empresas. Posteriormente, en 
el tercer trabajo, denominado “Revisando la Teoría del Trade-off de Estructura 
de Capital: el Papel Moderador de la Estructura de Propiedad de la Empresa”, 
presentado en el capítulo 4, detallamos algunas características comunes entre 
la deuda y el IOE, y analizamos sus diferencias con otros escudos fiscales. 
Las conclusiones generales pueden resumirse en tres grandes bloques. 
En primer lugar, nuestros resultados sugieren que los accionistas aceptan la 
idea de que la presencia de las empresas en el NM reduce la posibilidad de que 
los directivos y accionistas mayoritarios desvíen los recursos empresariales 
para finalidades que no coinciden con la maximización de la riqueza 
empresarial. Como consecuencia, los accionistas exigen menos dividendos de 
las empresas, que pueden usar la tesorería disponible para financiar sus 
oportunidades de inversión. Por ello, concluimos que el dualismo regulatorio 




en Brasil es una medida efectiva para generar confianza entre las empresas 
cotizadas en Bolsa y sus accionistas, y que sirve como un sustituto de los 
dividendos para reducir los costes de agencia entre accionistas controladores y 
accionistas minoritarios. 
En segundo lugar, los resultados revelan que las empresas del NM se 
encuentran menos endeudadas que sus homólogas de otros segmentos, 
pudiéndose explicar ese hecho por dos posibles razones: por un lado, es posible 
que las empresas usen el NM para transmitir su compromiso con todos los 
accionistas, de modo que el NM funcione como un mecanismo alternativo a la 
deuda para disciplinar el comportamiento de los directivos y accionistas 
controladores. También es posible que la reducción del apalancamiento 
empresarial se deba a que el NM esté cumpliendo su objetivo de mejorar la 
reputación de las empresas y que aumente el interés de los inversores, 
disminuyendo la necesidad de las empresas de recurrir a la deuda para financiar 
sus actividades y oportunidades de inversión, al hacer la emisión de capital 
más atractiva o factible que la emisión de deuda o que el crédito bancario. 
También examinamos el efecto de la incorporación a los niveles 
intermedios de la Bolsa en las decisiones de dividendos y de estructura de 
capital. Los resultados demuestran que la inclusión en esos segmentos tiene un 
impacto negativo en la distribución de beneficios, pero ese impacto es menos 
acusado que el generado por la incorporación al NM. Esto sugiere que, cuanto 




más exigentes sean las prácticas de gobierno adoptadas por las empresas, 
mayor será la confianza establecida entre las empresas y los accionistas 
minoritarios, lo cual llevará los inversores a exigir menos dividendos de las 
empresas y permitir la utilización de los fondos generados por la empresa para 
la financiación de las oportunidades de crecimiento. Además, encontramos que 
la incorporación a los niveles intermedios de la Bolsa no afecta a las decisiones 
de estructura de capital de las empresas. Consecuentemente, entendemos que 
dichos niveles no imponen requisitos suficientemente exigentes para 
reemplazar la capacidad de la deuda de mitigar los conflictos de agencia o para 
aliviar las restricciones financieras de las empresas.  
En tercer lugar, nuestros resultados indican que la importancia de los 
impuestos sobre las decisiones corporativas se ve significativamente influida 
por la identidad dominante entre los accionistas de las empresas. 
Concretamente, encontramos que la presencia de accionistas individuales y de 
estructuras piramidales de propiedad no solamente aumenta la propensión de 
las empresas a elegir el canal de payout que produce más beneficios fiscales 
globales, sino que también lleva las empresas a distribuir mayores flujos de 
caja por el canal de payout fiscalmente más ventajoso. Por otro lado, nuestros 
resultados sugieren los accionistas institucionales no explotan totalmente las 
ventajas fiscales ya que, a pesar de que la presencia dominante de ese tipo de 
accionistas lleva a las empresas a obtener mayores ahorros fiscales a través del 




uso de IOE que de dividendos, no encontramos relación significativa entre la 
presencia de accionistas institucionales y el uso de IOE.  
En esta misma línea, encontramos que la presencia de accionistas 
individuales lleva las empresas a reducir el uso de deuda cuando emplean el 
IOE, mientras que los accionistas institucionales no influyen en esta relación. 
También examinamos si el uso de IOE lleva las empresas a aprovechar menos 
otros escudos fiscales cuando los accionistas dominantes son aquellos que más 
pueden explotar la ventaja fiscal del IOE frente a los EFAD. Una vez más, los 
resultados indican que las empresas con accionistas individuales que usan IOE 
emplean en menor medida los escudos fiscales. Sin embargo, ese 
resultado -que es coherente con la teoría- no tiene su continuación cuando se 
estudian los accionistas institucionales.  
Otro punto que hemos examinado es si el grado de concentración de 
propiedad puede modelar las anteriores relaciones. Nuestros resultados 
apuntan que la concentración accionarial de los inversores individuales y de 
las estructuras piramidales de propiedad tiene un efecto positivo en la eficacia 
y en la eficiencia de la relación entre impuestos y política de payout. Además, 
encontramos que una mayor presencia de accionistas individuales conduce a 
las empresas que usan IOE a reducir el uso de otros EFAD.  
En resumen, concluimos que una reforma en las prácticas de gobierno 
corporativo por parte de las autoridades de mercado puede generar confianza 




entre empresas e inversores, atenuando la necesidad de la estructura de capital 
y los dividendos como mecanismos para reducir los problemas de agencia. 
Asimismo, constatamos que la importancia de los impuestos en las decisiones 
corporativas se ve afectada por la estructura de propiedad y, por lo tanto, la 
introducción de un mecanismo de ACE puede ser efectiva para reducir las 
distorsiones generadas por la diferencia en el tratamiento fiscal entre deuda y 





En esta tesis doctoral hemos hecho uso de las características 
idiosincrásicas del marco institucional brasileño para ampliar el conocimiento 
sobre dos decisiones estratégicas de las empresas, la política de dividendos y 
de estructura de capital, proporcionando una perspectiva diferente y nuevos 
argumentos. Dichas características permiten el estudio de los efectos de los 
mecanismos de gobierno corporativo y de los impuestos en las decisiones de 
la empresa. El hecho de que en Brasil existieran, en un mismo mercado de 
capitales, segmentos paralelos con diferentes exigencias de gobierno 
corporativo o de que las empresas puedan elegir canales de distribución de 
beneficios con características semejantes, pero con implicaciones tributarias 




distintas, constituye una oportunidad para validar y contrastar los resultados de 
investigaciones anteriores.  
Esta tesis contribuye a la literatura especializada al mostrar que los 
esfuerzos llevados a cabo en los mercados bursátiles para avanzar en la 
protección de los accionistas minoritarios pueden mejorar el ambiente 
institucional del país, lo cual desafía la visión predominante en el enfoque Law 
and Finance, según el cual la protección de los inversores es fruto de un origen 
legal estático y difícilmente mutable a lo largo del tiempo. El hecho de 
habernos centrado en un país emergente, caracterizado por ofrecer una débil 
protección de los accionistas minoritarios, también puede proporcionar 
orientación a otros países con características institucionales semejantes, al 
mostrar la eficacia de una reforma impulsada por el regulador del mercado para 
mejorar la protección de los accionistas y reforzar la confianza de los 
inversores.  
Asimismo, esta tesis profundiza en el estudio de la alternativa 
introducida en Brasil para corregir la discriminación fiscal entre la deuda y los 
recursos propios. Concretamente, investigamos si el ACE brasileño es capaz 
de minorar los problemas derivados del uso excesivo de la deuda, que podrían 
exacerbar la vulnerabilidad de las empresas en periodos de crisis económica 
(Portal and Laureano, 2016), las estrategias de reducción de impuestos a través 
de empresas del mismo grupo de negocios (De Mooij and Devereux, 2010), o 




de asignación ineficiente de inversiones al seleccionar los proyectos 
únicamente por su beneficio fiscal (Fatica et al. 2012).   
En contraposición a muchos estudios anteriores, que han abordado los 
efectos fiscales de las decisiones de dividendos y de estructura de capital bajo 
la perspectiva de la empresa o de los accionistas de forma separada, una 
contribución de nuestro trabajo es la consideración de los impuestos desde la 
doble perspectiva conjunta de empresas y accionistas. Es importante indicar 
que ya Portal y Laureano (2016) habían investigado el efecto del IOE en la 
reducción del sesgo fiscal de la deuda, encontrando que el uso del IOE tiene 
un efecto directo positivo en el endeudamiento. Sin embargo, esos autores no 
consideran el efecto moderador del tipo de accionista en esta relación. Nuestro 
análisis muestra que la eficacia del IOE para reducir el sesgo fiscal de la deuda 
depende de la identidad de los accionistas. Ello pone de manifiesto las 
diferentes motivaciones de los grupos de accionistas y su efecto mediador en 
la influencia de los impuestos en las decisiones corporativas.  
3. Limitaciones y futuras investigaciones 
 
 
A pesar del esfuerzo realizado, es indudable que nuestra tesis doctoral 
presenta algunas limitaciones que abren sendas vías para futuros trabajos. Una 
primera reflexión debe centrarse en el resultado de que la incorporación al NM 
tiene un efecto negativo en el endeudamiento de las empresas. Atribuimos este 




resultado a dos posibles razones: el efecto sustitutivo del NM como mecanismo 
disciplinario o la menor incidencia de las restricciones financieras en las 
empresas que cotizan en ese segmento. Sin embargo, hemos de reconocer que 
no hemos medido directamente el efecto del NM sobre las restricciones 
financieras y tampoco hemos verificado si las empresas, al incorporarse al NM, 
sustituyen deuda por recursos propios. Investigaciones futuras podrían 
centrarse en contrastar ambos comportamientos. Esta comprobación puede ser 
realizada, por ejemplo, a través de un análisis de eventos en el que se 
examinaría el comportamiento de las acciones y de la estructura de capital de 
las empresas en el periodo anterior y posterior al registro en el NM. Existen 
igualmente antecedentes del estudio de las restricciones financieras en el 
mercado brasileño, por lo que los nuevos estudios podrían utilizar un método 
análogo, aplicándolo a los nuevos segmentos de la Bolsa. 
Partiendo de la idea de que la adopción del NM per se representa un 
compromiso de las empresas con los patrones más estrictos de gobierno 
corporativo, futuros trabajos podrían ahondar en el efecto sobre otro tipo de 
prácticas de transparencia como la adopción de estándares contables 
internacionales en la publicación de sus estados financieros. Además, sería 
conveniente analizar el efecto de los nuevos segmentos en los consejos de 
administración de las empresas, puesto que el NM impone que las empresas 
mantengan por lo menos un 20% de consejeros independientes en los consejos 




de administración. También resulta interesante examinar la efectividad del 
tribunal de arbitraje del NM como moderador de la relación entre las empresas 
y sus accionistas minoritarios. En los últimos años varias empresas registradas 
en el NM se han visto implicadas en procesos de corrupción que han dañado 
la riqueza empresarial (por ejemplo, los casos del grupo JBS y del grupo EBX). 
Futuras investigaciones podrían estudiar si el tribunal de arbitraje ha cumplido 
adecuadamente su papel de proteger los intereses de los accionistas 
minoritarios.  
Otra línea de trabajo sería incorporar el efecto de la heterogeneidad en 
la estructura de propiedad. Como apuntan Serrasqueiro et al. (2016), el efecto 
de los impuestos no solo depende del tipo de inversor (por ejemplo, familias o 
particulares), sino también de la edad y el tamaño de las empresas familiares. 
De hecho, esos autores encuentran que las empresas familiares con más edad 
se acercan más a los principios de la teoría del trade-off que las empresas 
familiares más jóvenes. Otra línea de trabajo sería profundizar en la naturaleza 
de los inversores institucionales, distinguiendo los denominados “sensibles a 
la presión” de los “resistentes a la presión”. Futuros trabajos podrían analizar 
el efecto de esa heterogeneidad en la relación entre impuestos y decisiones 
financieras de las empresas. 














CHAPTER 3: FINAL REMARKS 







In this doctoral thesis, we analysed the influence of corporate governance, the 
fiscal framework k and the ownership structure on the payout and capital structure 
decisions of companies. To achieve this objective, we use the Brazilian institutional 
framework as it presents two specific characteristics that make it an ideal environment 
for this study: the existence of different segments in the Brazilian Stock Exchange and 
the existence of the so-called interest on equity. 
Regarding the first characteristic mentioned above, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange 
launched years ago segments with different levels of corporate governance requirements. 
The segment with more stringent requirements is the so-called New Market (NM), which 
is followed by Levels 1 and 2. The creation of these segments is inspired by the concept 
of functional convergence, according to which, in countries with institutional 
shortcomings, it must be the capital markets that take the initiative in adopting measures 
to improve corporate governance given the difficulties of reform faced by national 
legislation. 
The second specific feature is the existence in Brazil of Allowance for Corporate 
Equity system, namely, the Interest on Equity IOE, which is a tool that allows companies 
to deduct a notional interest rate for the use of equity. Despite being a mechanism of 
payout with characteristics similar to dividends, it presents a remarkable different tax 
treatment. Given the deductibility of interest for the use of equity, the IOE is also a tax 
shield alternative to debt, which has implications for the decisions on both payout and 
capital structure policies of the Brazilian firms. 
This doctoral thesis is structured in two different sections in which we try to 
address two objectives. The first one is to analyse whether and how the incorporation of 




firms into the alternative corporate governance segments affects the dividend and capital 
structure policies of listed companies. To achieve this purpose, in the first paper, titled 
"Regulatory Dualism as an Alternative Trust-Enhancing Mechanism for Dividends and 
Debt: Evidence from Brazil", we examined the effect of the different segments of 
corporate governance on the internal characteristics of the companies. Subsequently, we 
study whether the incorporation to either the NM or the intermediate segments has an 
outcome or substitute effect in the dividend distribution decisions and if that incorporation 
affects the financing decisions of the companies. 
The second objective is to analyse whether the ownership structure has a 
moderating role in the relationship between taxes and payout and capital structure policies 
of companies. To achieve this objective, we expose in the second work, entitled "The 
Relationship between Taxes and Payout Policy: The Impact of Shareholder Types", the 
tax consequences of the use of dividends and IOE relating them to the identity of firms’ 
shareholders. Later, in the third paper, entitled "Reviewing the Trade-off Theory of 
Capital Structure: The Moderating Role of the Company's Ownership Structure", 
presented in chapter 4, we detail some common characteristics between the debt and the 
IOE. We then analyse the differences between IOE and other existing non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS). 
The general conclusions of this dissertation can be summarized in three blocks. 
First, our results suggest that shareholders accept the idea that the presence of companies 
in the NM reduces the possibility that managers and majority shareholders divert 
corporate resources for purposes that do not coincide with the maximization of corporate 
wealth. As a result, shareholders demand less dividends from NM companies, which can 
use the available cash to finance their investment opportunities. Therefore, we conclude 
that the regulatory dualism in Brazil is an effective measure to generate confidence among 




listed companies and their shareholders, and that it serves as a substitute for dividends to 
reduce agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders. 
Secondly, the results reveal that NM companies are less indebted than their non-
NM counterparts, and this fact can be explained for two possible reasons: on the one hand, 
companies may use the NM to convey their commitment to all the shareholders, so that 
the NM functions as an alternative mechanism to the debt to discipline the behaviour of 
the controlling directors and shareholders. It is also possible that the reduction in 
corporate leverage is due to the NM meeting its objective of improving the reputation of 
companies and increasing the interest of investors, reducing the need for companies to 
rely on debt to finance their activities by making the issuance of capital more attractive 
or feasible than debt issuances or bank credit. 
Third, our results indicate that the importance of taxes on corporate decisions is 
significantly influenced by the dominant identity of firms’ shareholders. Specifically, we 
find that the presence of individual shareholders and pyramid structures of ownership not 
only increases the propensity of companies to choose the payout channel that produces 
greater global tax benefits, but also leads companies to distribute higher cash flows 
through the most advantageous payout channel. On the other hand, our results suggest 
institutional shareholders do not fully exploit the tax advantages since, despite the 
dominant presence of this type of shareholders allows companies to obtain greater tax 
savings through IOE, we did not find a significant relationship between the presence of 
institutional shareholders and the use of IOE. 
In this same line, we find that the presence of individual shareholders makes 
companies reduce the use of debt when they use IOE, while the presence of institutional 
shareholders does not influence this relationship. We also examine whether the use of 
IOE leads companies to rely less on other non-debt tax shields when the dominant 




shareholders are those that have incentives to exploit IOE over other NDTS. Once again, 
the results indicate that companies with individual shareholders that use IOE employ tax 
shields to a lesser extent. However, this result, which is consistent with the theory, is not 
confirmed when studying the institutional shareholders. 
Another issue that we have verified is whether the degree of ownership 
concentration can model the previous relationships. Our results suggest that the 
concentration of individual investors and pyramidal structures of ownership has a positive 
effect on the effectiveness and efficiency of the relationship between taxes and payout 
policy. In addition, we found that a greater presence of individual shareholders leads 
companies that use IOE to reduce the use of other NDTS. 
In summary, we conclude that a reform in corporate governance practices by 
market authorities can work as a trust-generating device between companies and 
investors, mitigating the need for dividends and leverage as mechanisms to reduce agency 
problems. Moreover, we conclude that different types of shareholders have different 
implications for the relation between taxes and financial decisions. Therefore, the 





In this doctoral thesis we have used the idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
Brazilian institutional framework to broaden knowledge about two strategic decisions of 
companies, namely, dividend policy and capital structure, providing a different 
perspective and new arguments. These characteristics allow the study of the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms and taxes on corporate decisions. The fact that in 
Brazil there are parallel segments in the same capital market with different corporate 




governance requirements or that companies could choose channels to disgorge cash to 
shareholders with similar characteristics but with different tax implications, constitutes 
an opportunity to validate and contrast the results of previous investigations. 
This work contributes to the specialized literature by showing that the efforts 
carried out in the stock markets to advance in the protection of minority shareholders can 
improve the institutional environment of the country, which challenges the predominant 
vision in the Law & Finance approach, according to which the protection of investors is 
the result of a static legal origin and difficult to change over time. The fact that we focused 
on an emerging country, characterized by offering weak protection to minority 
shareholders, can also provide guidance to other countries with similar institutional 
characteristics, by showing the effectiveness of a reform promoted by the market 
regulator to improve protection of shareholders and strengthen investor confidence. 
Also, this thesis deepens in the study of the alternative introduced in Brazil to 
correct the distortions generated by the fiscal discrimination between debt and equity. 
Specifically, we investigate if the Brazilian Allowance for Corporate Equity system is 
able to reduce the problems derived from the excessive use of debt, which could 
exacerbate the vulnerability of companies in periods of economic crisis (Portal and 
Laureano, 2016), tax reduction strategies through of companies of the same business 
group (De Mooij and Devereux, 2010), or of inefficient allocation of investments when 
selecting projects solely for their fiscal benefit (Fatica et al., 2012). 
In contrast to many previous studies, which have addressed the fiscal effects of 
payout and capital structure decisions from the perspective of companies or shareholders 
separately, a contribution of our work is the consideration of taxes from the joint 
perspective of companies and shareholders. It is important to note that Portal and 
Laureano (2016) had already investigated the effect of IOE in reducing the fiscal bias of 




the debt, finding that the use of IOE has a direct positive effect on indebtedness. However, 
these authors do not consider the moderating effect of the shareholder type in this 
relationship. Our analysis shows that the effectiveness of IOE in reducing the fiscal bias 
of the debt depends upon the identity of the shareholders. This highlights the different 
motivations of the groups of shareholders and their moderating effect on the influence of 
taxes on corporate decisions. 
4. Limitations and Future Research 
 
Despite the efforts made to use robust analyses methods and consistent results, it 
is undoubted that our doctoral thesis has some limitations that open paths for future work. 
A first reflection should focus on the result that the incorporation into the NM has a 
negative effect on the indebtedness of the companies. We attribute this finding to two 
possible reasons: the substitution effect of the NM as a disciplinary mechanism or the 
lower incidence of financial restrictions on the companies that are listed in that segment. 
However, we must recognize that we have not directly measured the effect of the NM on 
financial restrictions and we have not verified whether companies, when joining the NM, 
substitute debt for own resources. Future research could focus on contrasting both 
behaviours. This verification can be carried out, for example, through an analysis of 
events in which the behaviour of the shares and the capital structure of the companies in 
the period before and after registration in the NM would be examined. There are also 
antecedents of the study of financial restrictions in the Brazilian market, so that the new 
studies could use a similar method, applying it to the new segments of the Stock 
Exchange. 
Based on the idea that the adoption of the NM per se represents a commitment of 
companies with the strictest corporate governance standards, future work could deepen 
the effect on other types of transparency practices such as the adoption of international 




accounting standards in the publication of their financial statements. In addition, it would 
be convenient to analyse the effect of the new segments on the boards of directors of the 
companies, since the NM requires that companies maintain at least 20% of independent 
directors on the boards of directors. It is also interesting to examine the effectiveness of 
the NM arbitration chamber as moderator of the relationship between companies and their 
minority shareholders. In recent years several NM companies have been involved in 
corruption processes that have damaged business wealth (for example, the cases of the 
JBS group and the EBX group). Future investigations could study whether the arbitration 
chamber has adequately fulfilled its role of protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders. 
Future research could also incorporate the effect of heterogeneity in the ownership 
structure. As pointed out by Serrasqueiro et al. (2016), the effect of taxes depends not 
only on the type of investor (for example, families or individuals), but also on the age and 
size of family businesses. In fact, these authors find that older family businesses are closer 
to the principles of trade-off theory than younger family businesses. Another line of work 
would be to deepen the nature of institutional investors, distinguishing the so-called 
"pressure sensitive" from the "pressure resistant". Future work could analyse the effect of 
this heterogeneity on the relationship between taxes and financial decisions of companies. 
 
 
 
